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The economy needs agent-based modelling
The leaders of the world are flying the economy by the seat of their pants, say J. Doyne Farmer and  
Duncan Foley. There is, however, a way to help guide financial policies.
In today’s high-tech age, one naturally assumes that US President Barack Obama’s economic team and its inter-
national counterparts are using sophis-
ticated quantitative computer models 
to guide us out of the current economic 
crisis. They are not.
The best models they have are of two 
types, both with fatal flaws. Type one is 
econometric: empirical statistical models 
that are fit to past data. These suc-
cessfully forecast a few quarters ahead 
as long as things stay more or less the 
same, but fail in the face of great change. 
Type two goes by the name of ‘dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium’. These 
models assume a perfect world, and by 
their very nature rule out crises of the 
type we are experiencing now. 
As a result, economic policy-makers 
are basing their decisions on common 
sense, and on anecdotal analogies to 
previous crises such as Japan’s lost 
decade or the Great Depression (see 
Nature 457, 957; 2009). The leaders of 
the world are flying the economy by the 
seat of their pants.
This is hard for most non-economists to 
believe. Aren’t people on Wall Street using 
fancy mathematical models? Yes, but for a 
completely different purpose: modelling the 
potential profit and risk of individual trades. 
There is no attempt to assemble the pieces 
and understand the behaviour of the whole 
economic system.
There is a better way: agent-based models. 
An agent-based model is a computerized simu-
lation of a number of decision-makers (agents) 
and institutions, which interact 
through prescribed rules. The agents 
can be as diverse as needed — from 
consumers to policy-makers and Wall 
Street professionals — and the institu-
tional structure can include everything 
from banks to the government. Such 
models do not rely on the assumption 
that the economy will move towards 
a predetermined equilibrium state, as other 
models do. Instead, at any given time, each 
agent acts according to its current situation, the 
state of the world around it, and the rules gov-
erning its behaviour. An individual consumer, 
for example, might decide whether to save or 
spend based on the rate of inflation, his or her 
current optimism about the future, and behav-
ioural rules deduced from psychology experi-
ments. The computer keeps track of the many 
agent interactions, to see what happens over 
time. Agent-based simulations can handle a far 
wider range of nonlinear behaviour than con-
ventional equilibrium models. Policy-makers 
can thus simulate an artificial economy under 
different policy scenarios and quantitatively 
explore their consequences. 
Why is this type of modelling not well-
developed in economics? Because of his-
torical choices made to address the 
complexity of the economy and the 
importance of human reasoning and 
adaptability. 
The notion that financial econo-
mies are complex systems can be 
traced at least as far back as Adam 
Smith in the late 1700s. More recently 
John Maynard Keynes and his fol-
lowers attempted to describe and quantify 
this complexity based on historical patterns. 
Keynesian economics enjoyed a heyday in the 
decades after the Second World War, but was 
forced out of the mainstream after failing a cru-
cial test during the mid-seventies. The Keyne-
sian predictions suggested that inflation could 
pull society out of a recession: that, as 
rising prices had historically stimulated 
supply, producers would respond to 
the rising prices seen under inflation 
by increasing production and hiring 
more workers. But when US policy-
makers increased the money supply in 
an attempt to stimulate employment, it 
didn’t work — they ended up with both 
high inflation and high unemployment, 
a miserable state called ‘stagflation’. 
Robert Lucas and others argued in 1976 
that Keynesian models failed because 
they neglected the power of human 
learning and adaptation. Firms and 
workers learned that inflation is just 
inflation, and is not the same as a real 
rise in prices relative to wages. 
Realistic behaviour
The cure for macroeconomic theory, 
however, may have been worse than the 
disease. During the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, rational expectations 
emerged as the dominant paradigm in 
economics. This approach assumes 
that humans have perfect access to informa-
tion and adapt instantly and rationally to new 
situations, maximizing their long-run personal 
advantage. Of course real people often act on 
the basis of overconfidence, fear and peer pres-
sure — topics that behavioural economics is 
now addressing. 
But there is a still larger problem. Even if 
rational expectations are a reasonable model of 
human behaviour, the mathematical machinery 
is cumbersome and requires drastic simplifica-
tions to get tractable results. The equilibrium 
models that were developed, such as those used 
by the Federal Reserve, by necessity stripped 
away most of the structure of a real economy. 
There are no banks or derivatives, much less 
sub-prime mortgages or credit default swaps 
— these introduce too much nonlinearity and 
complexity for equilibrium methods to handle. 
When it comes to setting policy, the predictions 
of these models aren’t even wrong, they are sim-
ply non-existent (see Nature 455, 1181; 2008). 
Agent-based models potentially present 
a way to model the financial economy as a 
complex system, as Keynes attempted to do, 
while taking human adaptation and learning 
into account, as Lucas advocated. Such mod-
els allow for the creation of a kind of virtual 
Agent-based models could help to evaluate policies designed to 
foster economic recovery.
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universe, in which many players can 
act in complex — and realistic — 
ways. In some other areas of science, 
such as epidemiology or traffic con-
trol, agent-based models already help 
policy-making. 
Promising efforts
There are some successful agent-
based models of small portions of the 
economy. The models of the finan-
cial market built by Blake LeBaron 
of Brandeis University in Waltham, 
Massachusetts, for example, provide a 
plausible explanation for bubbles and crashes, 
reproducing liquidity crises and crashes that 
never appear in equilibrium models. Rob 
Axtell of George Mason University in Fairfax, 
Virginia, has devised firm dynamics models 
that simulate how companies grow and decline 
as workers move between them. These repli-
cate the power–law distribution of company 
size that one sees in real life: a very few large 
firms, and a vast number of very small ones 
with only one or two employees. 
Other promising efforts include the credit 
sector model of Mauro Gallegati’s group at the 
Marche Polytechnic University in Ancona, 
Italy, and the monetary model developed 
by Robert Clower of the University of South 
Carolina in Columbia and Peter Howitt of 
Brown University in Providence, Rhode 
Island. These models are very useful, but 
their creators would be the first to say that they 
provide only a tentative first step.
To see in more detail how an agent-based 
model works, consider the model that one 
of us (Farmer) has developed with Stefan 
Thurner of the University of Vienna and John 
Geanakoplos of Yale University to explore how 
leverage affects fluctuations in stock prices 
(published in a Santa Fe Institute working 
paper). Leverage, the invest-
ment of borrowed funds, is 
measured as the ratio of 
total assets owned to the 
wealth of the borrower; if a 
house is bought with a 20% 
down-payment the lever-
age is five. There are four types of agents in 
this model. ‘Noise traders’, who trade more or 
less at random, but are slightly biased toward 
driving prices towards a fundamental value; 
hedge funds, which hold a stock when it is 
under-priced and otherwise hold cash; inves-
tors who decide whether to invest in a hedge 
fund; and a bank that can lend money to the 
hedge funds, allowing them to buy more 
stock. Normally, the presence of the hedge 
funds damps volatility, pushing the stock 
price towards its fundamental value. But, to 
contain their risk, the banks cap leverage at a 
predetermined maximum value. If the price of 
the stock drops while a fund is fully leveraged, 
the fund’s wealth plummets and its leverage 
increases; thus the fund has to sell stock to pay 
off part of its loan and keep within its leverage 
limit, selling into a falling market.
This agent-based model shows how the 
behaviour of the hedge funds amplifies price 
fluctuations, and in extreme cases causes 
crashes. The price statistics from this model look 
very much like reality. It shows that the standard 
ways banks attempt to reduce their own risk can 
create more risk for the whole system.
Previous models of leverage based on 
equilibrium theory showed qualitatively how 
leverage can lead to crashes, but they gave no 
quantitative information about how this affects 
the statistical properties of prices. The agent 
approach simulates complex and nonlinear 
behaviour that is so far intractable in equilib-
rium models. It could be made more realistic 
by adding more detailed information about 
the behaviour of real banks and funds, and this 
could shed light on many important questions. 
For example, does spreading risk across many 
financial institutions stabilize the financial 
system, or does it increase financial fragility? 
Better data on lending 
between banks and hedge 
funds would make it possi-
ble to model this accurately. 
What if the banks themselves 
borrow money and use lever-
age too, a process that played 
a key role in the current crisis? The model could 
be used to see how these banks might behave in 
an alternative regulatory environment.
Agent-based models are not a panacea. The 
major challenge lies in specifying how the 
agents behave, and in particular, in choosing 
the rules they use to make decisions. In many 
cases this is still done by common sense and 
guesswork, which is only sometimes sufficient 
to mimic real behaviour. An attempt to model 
all the details of a realistic problem can rapidly 
lead to a complicated simulation, where it is 
difficult to determine what causes 
what. To make agent-based modelling 
useful we must proceed systemati-
cally, avoiding arbitrary assumptions, 
carefully grounding and testing each 
piece of the model against reality and 
introducing additional complexity 
only when it is needed. Done right, 
the agent-based method can provide 
an unprecedented understanding of 
the emergent properties of interact-
ing parts in complex circumstances 
where intuition fails.
A thorough attempt to understand 
the whole economy through agent-based mod-
elling will require integrating models of financial 
interactions with those of industrial production, 
real estate, government spending, taxes, business 
investment, foreign trade and investment, and 
with consumer behaviour. The resulting simula-
tion could be used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of different approaches to economic stimulus, 
such as tax reductions versus public spending.
Holistic approach
Such economic models should be able to 
provide an alternative tool to give insight 
into how government policies could affect 
the broad characteristics of economic per-
formance, to quantitatively explore how the 
economy is likely to react under different sce-
narios. In principle it might even be possible 
to create an agent-based economic model 
capable of making useful forecasts of the real 
economy, although this is ambitious. 
Creating a carefully crafted agent-based 
model of the whole economy is, like climate 
modelling, a huge undertaking. It requires 
close feedback between simulation, testing, data 
collection and the development of theory. This 
demands serious computing power and multi-
disciplinary collaboration among economists, 
computer scientists, psychologists, biologists 
and physical scientists with experience in large-
scale modelling. A few million dollars — much 
less than 0.001% of the US financial stimulus 
package against the recession — would allow a 
serious start on such an effort.
Given the enormity of the stakes, such an 
approach is well worth trying. ■
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See Editorial, page 667. Further reading 
accompanies this article online.
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“The policy predictions 
of the models that are in 
use aren’t wrong, they 
are simply non-existent.”
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